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WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION VERSTEHEN DER WTO: GRUNDLAGEN Grundsätze des Handelssystems Die WTO-Vereinbarungen sind langwierig und komplex, weil es sich um Rechtstexte handelt, die eine breite Palette von Aktivitäten abdecken. Sie beschäftigen sich mit: Landwirtschaft, Textilien und Bekleidung, Banken, Telekommunikation, Regierungskäufe, Industriestandards und Produktsicherheit, Lebensmittelhygienevorschriften, geistiges Eigentum und vieles mehr. Aber eine Reihe von einfachen, grundlegenden Prinzipien laufen in all diesen Dokumenten. Diese Grundsätze sind die Grundlage für das multilaterale Handelssystem. Ein genauerer Blick auf diese Prinzipien: Klicken Sie auf, um ein Element zu öffnen. Ein Baum für die Website-Navigation wird hier geöffnet, wenn Sie JavaScript in Ihrem Browser aktivieren. 1. Most-favored-nation (MFN): Behandlung anderer Personen gleichermaßen Im Rahmen der WTO-Vereinbarungen können Länder in der Regel zwischen ihren Handelspartnern nicht diskriminieren. Gewähren Sie jemandem einen besonderen Gefallen (wie z. B. einen niedrigeren Zollsatz für eines ihrer Produkte) und Sie müssen das gleiche für alle anderen WTO-Mitglieder tun. Dieses Prinzip ist als Meistbegünstigung (MFN) bekannt (siehe Kasten). Es ist so wichtig, dass es der erste Artikel des Allgemeinen Zoll - und Handelsabkommens (GATT) ist. Die den Handel mit Waren regelt. MFN ist auch im Rahmen des Allgemeinen Übereinkommens über den Handel mit Dienstleistungen (GATS) (Artikel 2) und des Abkommens über handelsbezogene Aspekte der Rechte des geistigen Eigentums (TRIPS) (Artikel 4) vorrangig, obwohl in jeder Vereinbarung das Prinzip etwas anders behandelt wird . Gemeinsam decken diese drei Vereinbarungen alle drei von der WTO behandelten Handelsbereiche ab. Einige Ausnahmen sind erlaubt. Zum Beispiel können Länder ein Freihandelsabkommen einrichten, das nur für Waren gilt, die innerhalb der Gruppe gehandelt werden, die Waren von außen diskriminiert. Oder sie können den Entwicklungsländern einen besonderen Zugang zu ihren Märkten geben. Oder ein Land kann Barrieren gegen Produkte erheben, die als ungerecht aus bestimmten Ländern gehandelt werden. Und in den Diensten sind die Länder unter bestimmten Umständen zu diskriminieren erlaubt. Aber die Vereinbarungen erlauben diese Ausnahmen nur unter strengen Bedingungen. Im Allgemeinen bedeutet MFN, dass jedes Mal, wenn ein Land eine Handelsbarriere senkt oder einen Markt eröffnet, dies für die gleichen Waren oder Dienstleistungen von allen seinen Handelspartnern getan werden muss, ob reich oder arm, schwach oder stark. 2. Nationale Behandlung: Behandeln von Ausländern und Einheimischen gleichermaßen Importe und lokal produzierte Waren sollten gleichmäßig behandelt werden, zumindest nachdem die ausländischen Waren in den Markt eingetreten sind. Gleiches gilt für ausländische und inländische Dienstleistungen sowie für ausländische und lokale Marken, Urheberrechte und Patente. Dieser Grundsatz der nationalen Behandlung (die anderen die gleiche Behandlung wie die eigenen Staatsangehörigen gibt) findet sich auch in allen drei HauptwTO-Abkommen (Artikel 3 des GATT, Artikel 17 des GATS und Artikel 3 der TRIPS), obwohl das Prinzip noch einmal behandelt wird Etwas anders in jedem dieser. Nationale Behandlung gilt nur, wenn ein Produkt, eine Dienstleistung oder ein geistiges Eigentum in den Markt gelangt ist. Daher ist die Erhebung der Zollgebühr bei einer Einfuhr kein Verstoß gegen die nationale Behandlung, auch wenn lokal produzierte Produkte keine gleichwertige Steuer erhoben werden. Freier Handel: allmählich durch Verhandlungen zurück nach oben Die Absenkung der Handelsbarrieren ist eines der offensichtlichsten Mittel zur Förderung des Handels. Zu den betroffenen Barrieren gehören Zölle (oder Tarife) und Maßnahmen wie Einfuhrverbote oder Quoten, die die Mengen selektiv einschränken. Von Zeit zu Zeit wurden auch andere Themen wie Bürokratie und Wechselkurspolitik diskutiert. Seit GATTs Schaffung in 1947-48 gab es acht Runden von Handelsverhandlungen. Eine neunte Runde, unter der Doha Development Agenda, ist nun im Gange. Zuerst konzentrierten sie sich auf die Senkung der Zölle (Zölle) auf importierte Waren. Infolge der Verhandlungen waren die Industrieländer bis Mitte der neunziger Jahre stetig auf weniger als 4 zurückgegangen. Aber bis in die 1980er Jahre hatten sich die Verhandlungen erweitert, um nichttarifäre Handelshemmnisse und die neuen Gebiete zu decken Wie Dienstleistungen und geistiges Eigentum. Eröffnungsmärkte können von Vorteil sein, aber es erfordert auch eine Anpassung. Die WTO-Vereinbarungen erlauben es den Ländern, allmählich durch eine fortschreitende Liberalisierung Veränderungen einzuführen. Die Entwicklungsländer werden in der Regel länger beansprucht, um ihren Verpflichtungen nachzukommen. Vorhersagbarkeit: durch Bindung und Transparenz zurück nach oben Manchmal kann man versprechen, keine Handelsbarriere zu erwerben, so wichtig wie eine Senkung, denn das Versprechen gibt den Unternehmen einen klareren Blick auf ihre zukünftigen Chancen. Mit Stabilität und Vorhersehbarkeit wird die Investition gefördert, Arbeitsplätze geschaffen und die Verbraucher können die Vorteile der Wettbewerbswahl und der niedrigeren Preise voll genießen. Das multilaterale Handelssystem ist ein Versuch der Regierungen, das Geschäftsumfeld stabil und vorhersehbar zu machen. Die Uruguay-Runde erhöhte die Bindungen Prozentsätze der Tarife, die vor und nach den Gesprächen von 1986-94 gebunden wurden (Dies sind Tariflinien, so dass die Prozentsätze nicht nach Handelsvolumen oder Wert gewichtet werden) In der WTO, in der Länder sich einverstanden erklären, ihre Märkte für Waren oder Dienstleistungen zu öffnen , Sie binden ihre Verpflichtungen. Für Waren gelten diese Bindungen zu den Zollzollspannen. Manchmal Länder Steuer Einfuhren zu Raten, die niedriger als die gebundenen Raten sind. Häufig ist dies in Entwicklungsländern der Fall. In den entwickelten Ländern sind die tatsächlich angefallenen Preise und die gebundenen Raten gleich. Ein Land kann seine Bindungen ändern, aber erst nach dem Verhandeln mit seinen Handelspartnern, was bedeuten könnte, sie für den Verlust des Handels zu kompensieren. Eine der Errungenschaften der multilateralen Handelsgespräche der Uruguay-Runde war die Erhöhung des Handelsvolumens unter verbindlichen Verpflichtungen (siehe Tabelle). In der Landwirtschaft haben 100 Produkte jetzt gebundene Tarife. Das Ergebnis von all dem: ein wesentlich höheres Maß an Marktsicherheit für Händler und Investoren. Das System versucht, Vorhersehbarkeit und Stabilität auch auf andere Weise zu verbessern. Ein Weg ist, die Verwendung von Quoten zu verhindern und andere Maßnahmen, die verwendet werden, um die Grenzen der Einfuhrmengen festzulegen, die die Quoten verwalten, können zu mehr Bürokratie und Vorwürfen des unfairen Spiels führen. Ein weiteres Ziel ist es, die Länder so klar und öffentlich wie möglich zu handeln. Viele WTO-Vereinbarungen verlangen von den Regierungen, ihre Politik und ihre Praktiken öffentlich im Land zu veröffentlichen oder die WTO zu benachrichtigen. Die regelmäßige Überwachung der nationalen Handelspolitik durch den Trade Policy Review Mechanismus bietet ein weiteres Mittel zur Förderung der Transparenz sowohl im Inland als auch auf multilateraler Ebene. Die WTO wird manchmal als Freihandelsinstanz bezeichnet, aber das ist nicht ganz richtig. Das System erlaubt Tarife und unter bestimmten Umständen andere Formen des Schutzes. Genauer gesagt ist es ein System von Regeln, die dem offenen, fairen und unverfälschten Wettbewerb gewidmet sind. Die Regeln für die Nichtdiskriminierung MFN und die nationale Behandlung sollen faire Handelsbedingungen sicherstellen. So sind auch diejenigen, die auf Dumping (Export unter unter Kosten, um Marktanteil zu gewinnen) und Subventionen. Die Fragen sind komplex, und die Regeln versuchen, festzustellen, was fair oder unfair ist, und wie Regierungen reagieren können, insbesondere durch die Erhebung zusätzlicher Einfuhrzölle, die zur Kompensation von Schäden durch unlauteren Handel entstanden sind. Viele der anderen WTO-Vereinbarungen zielen darauf ab, den fairen Wettbewerb zu unterstützen: in der Landwirtschaft, zum geistigen Eigentum, zum Beispiel Dienstleistungen. Die Vereinbarung über die öffentliche Beschaffung (eine plurilaterale Vereinbarung, weil sie von nur wenigen WTO-Mitgliedern unterzeichnet wird), erweitert die Wettbewerbsregeln auf Käufe von Tausenden von Regierungsstellen in vielen Ländern. Und so weiter. Förderung der Entwicklung und Wirtschaftsreformen nach oben Das WTO-System trägt zur Entwicklung bei. Auf der anderen Seite brauchen die Entwicklungsländer in der Zeit, in der sie die Systemabkommen umsetzen, Flexibilität. Und die Vereinbarungen selbst erben die früheren Bestimmungen des GATT, die besondere Unterstützung und Handelszugeständnisse für Entwicklungsländer ermöglichen. Über drei Viertel der WTO-Mitglieder sind Entwicklungsländer und Länder im Übergang zu Marktwirtschaften. Während der siebeneinhalb Jahre der Uruguay-Runde führten über 60 dieser Länder die Handelsliberalisierungsprogramme autonom ein. Gleichzeitig waren die Entwicklungsländer und die Transformationsökonomien in den Verhandlungen der Uruguay-Runde viel aktiver und einflussreicher als in jeder früheren Runde und in der aktuellen Doha-Entwicklungsagenda sogar noch mehr. Am Ende der Uruguay-Runde waren die Entwicklungsländer bereit, die meisten Verpflichtungen zu übernehmen, die für die entwickelten Länder erforderlich sind. Aber die Vereinbarungen gaben ihnen Übergangszeiten, um sich an die fremderen und vielleicht schwierigen WTO-Bestimmungen anzupassen, besonders für die ärmsten, am wenigsten entwickelten Länder. Eine am Ende der Runde verabschiedete Ministerialentscheidung dürfte die Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen für den Marktzugang auf die von den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern ausgeführten Waren beschleunigen, und sie suche eine verstärkte technische Unterstützung für sie. In jüngster Zeit haben die entwickelten Länder begonnen, zollfreie und quotenfreie Importe für fast alle Produkte aus den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern zuzulassen. Auf all dem geht die WTO und ihre Mitglieder immer noch durch einen Lernprozess. Die aktuelle Doha-Entwicklungsagenda umfasst die Entwicklungsländer, die sich mit der Umsetzung der Abkommen der Uruguay-Runde beschäftigen. Das Handelssystem sollte sein. Ohne Diskriminierung sollte ein Land nicht zwischen seinen Handelspartnern diskriminieren (es gibt ihnen gleichermaßen Meistbegünstigung oder MFN-Status), und es sollte nicht zwischen seinen eigenen und ausländischen Produkten, Diensten oder Staatsangehörigen diskriminieren (geben ihnen nationale Behandlung) freier Barrieren, die durchkommen Verhandlungen vorhersehbare ausländische Unternehmen, Investoren und Regierungen sollten zuversichtlich sein, dass Handelshemmnisse (einschließlich Tarife und nichttarifäre Barrieren) nicht willkürlich Tarifraten und Marktöffnungsverpflichtungen in der WTO stärker wettbewerbsfähig sind, um unlautere Praktiken wie Exportsubventionen zu entmutigen Dumping-Produkte unterhalb der Kosten zu gewinnen Marktanteil mehr vorteilhaft für weniger entwickelte Länder geben ihnen mehr Zeit zu justieren, größere Flexibilität und besondere Privilegien. Das klingt wie ein widerspruch Es schlägt eine spezielle Behandlung vor, aber in der WTO bedeutet es eigentlich Nichtdiskriminierung, die praktisch alle gleichermaßen behandelt. Das ist, was passiert. Jedes Mitglied behandelt alle anderen Mitglieder gleichermaßen als beliebteste Handelspartner. Wenn ein Land die Vorteile, die es einem Handelspartner gibt, verbessert, muss es allen anderen WTO-Mitgliedern die gleiche Behandlung geben, damit sie alle am meisten bevorzugt sind. Most-favored nation (MFN) Status nicht immer gleich Gleichbehandlung. Die ersten bilateralen MFN-Verträge bilden exklusive Clubs zu den am meisten bevorzugten Handelspartnern. Unter GATT und jetzt der WTO ist der MFN Club nicht mehr exklusiv. Das MFN-Prinzip sorgt dafür, dass jedes Land seine über140 Mitbürger gleichermaßen behandelt. Aber es gibt einige Ausnahmen. Die Herausforderungen des multilateralen Handelssystems bei der Bewältigung globaler Ziele der öffentlichen Politik Trotz einer rekordverdächtigen Zunahme der weltweiten Warenexporte um 14,5 Prozent sind die Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise und der globalen Rezession immer noch schneller auf eine konjunkturelle Erholung gerichtet. Relativ hohe Ölpreise in Verbindung mit anhaltender Arbeitslosigkeit und Maßnahmen zur Senkung der Haushaltsdefizite haben die kurzfristigen Wachstumsaussichten untergraben. Während der Handel von SouthSouth weiter explodiert, haben sich die Handelsungleichgewichte, d. H. Die Lücke zwischen den Exporten und den Importen im Vergleich zu 2009 im Vergleich zu 2009 (wenn auch kleiner als vor dem Krisenniveau) erweitert. Mittlerweile haben Handelsverhandlungen unter der Doha-Runde eine Sackgasse erreicht, die Ungewissheiten über die Zukunft der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) als Verhandlungsforum hervorbringt. Unter diesen Umständen sollte das System seinen Entscheidungsprozess über die Vorherrschaft der Mitgliedsstaaten, den Grundsatz des Konsenses und den Begriff des Einzelunternehmens, wie einige Kritiker vorgeschlagen haben, überdenken. Und wenn ja, wie könnte eine solche Reformagenda eingeleitet werden An der WTO Darüber hinaus erweckt die Lähmung des Systems über die Verhandlungsfunktion der WTO hinaus dringende Fragen über die Fähigkeit des Systems, auf dringende Herausforderungen unserer Zeit wie Handel und Klimawandel oder Ernährungssicherheit und Preisvolatilität zu reagieren . Indexausdrücke Thematische Schlüsselwörter160: Was wir heute sehen, ist die Lähmung in der Verhandlungsfunktion der WTO, sei es auf dem Marktzugang oder auf dem Regelmacher. Was wir uns stellen, ist die Unfähigkeit der WTO, sich an die globalen Handelsprioritäten anzupassen und anzupassen, die Sie nicht durch bilaterale Geschäfte lösen können. Pascal Lamy, an einem informellen Delegationsleiter des Handelsverhandlungsausschusses, 26. Juli 2011 1 Die Finanzkrise 200809 und die aktuelle Staatsschuldenkrise in Europa haben nicht nur die hohen weltweiten Konjunkturabhängigkeiten, sondern auch die wachsenden Herausforderungen hervorgehoben Bei der Verfolgung internationaler Kooperationsmaßnahmen, um dringende Herausforderungen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu bewältigen. In einer sich schnell verändernden multipolaren Welt, in der sich der ökonomische Reichtum schrittweise nach Osten und Süden verlagert und in welchen Ressourcenengpässen zunehmend zunehmen, bleibt die internationale Zusammenarbeit in der Krise. Der Aufstieg der Schwellenländer wie China, Indien oder Brasilien und der relative Rückgang der traditionellen Wirtschaftsmächte haben neue Chancen geschaffen, was sich in dem bisher unerreichten Wachstum des Südschloss-Handels in den letzten zehn Jahren widerspiegelt. Allerdings hat es auch neue Spannungen erzeugt, nicht zuletzt zwischen Ländern mit großen Handelsüberschüssen und denen mit wachsenden Handelsdefiziten. Solche Spannungen sind in internationalen Verhandlungen gleichermaßen schmackhaft wie die, die sich mit dem Klimawandel befassen. 2 Inzwischen ist die Zahl der hungrigen Menschen geschätzt, eine Milliarde im Jahr 2009 erreicht zu haben, Katapultierung der Ernährungssicherheit zurück an die Spitze der politischen Agenda. Da das Wachstum der Nachfrage weiterhin schneller steigt als die Zunahme des Angebots, die grundsätzlich auf ein niedriges Produktivitätswachstum zurückzuführen ist, dürften die Lebensmittelpreise in den kommenden Jahren hoch und volatil bleiben. Mehrere Faktoren haben dazu beigetragen, die Preisvolatilität zu steigern: niedrige Bestände, die sich aus einer Folge von wetterbedingtem Produktionsdefizit, einer wachsenden Nachfrage nach Biokraftstoffen, steigenden Energiepreisen und einer Abwertung des US-Dollars ergeben, wurden jedoch durch politische Reaktionen wie Exportbeschränkungen verschärft . 3 Dieses sich schnell verändernde Umfeld und die dringenden Bedürfnisse für internationale Kooperationsmaßnahmen zur Bewältigung von Bedenken um die Ernährungssicherheit, den Klimawandel oder die nicht nachhaltigen Handelsungleichgewichte hängen stark von der aktuellen Lähmung des multilateralen Handelssystems ab. Die Doha-Runde der Handelsverhandlungen unter der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) blieb seit mehreren Monaten in einer Schwebe, ohne wirkliche Perspektiven für die nahe Zukunft. Während mehrere Faktoren das Patt in den zehnjährigen Handelsgesprächen erklären, wirft diese Lähmung Unsicherheiten über die Zukunft des multilateralen Handelssystems auf. 4 Als Beitrag zu dieser Diskussion wird in diesem Kapitel untersucht, wie das multilaterale Handelssystem versucht hat, globale Ziele der öffentlichen Ordnung anzugehen und wie es in der Zukunft möglich ist. Nach einer kurzen Überprüfung der aktuellen Trends im internationalen Handel und der jüngsten Entwicklungen, die zur aktuellen Krise in der Doha-Runde geführt haben, sieht Abschnitt 3 mögliche Möglichkeiten zur Reform der Art und Weise, wie die WTO Verhandlungen führt. Schließlich konzentriert sich Abschnitt 4 darauf, wie die WTO in der Vergangenheit mit dem Fall der Ernährungssicherheit als Beispiel auf spezifische politische Ziele reagiert hat und was dies über die Art und Weise, wie sich das multilaterale Handelssystem auf breitere globale Ziele der öffentlichen Politik bezieht, erzählt . 5 Nach einem deutlichen Rückgang um 12 Prozent im Jahr 2009 stieg das Volumen der weltweiten Warenexporte im Jahr 2010 um 14,5 Prozent, so dass sich der weltweite Handel auf Vorkrisenniveau erholen konnte. Diese Zahl, die größte seit der Datenerhebung begann im Jahr 1950, begleitet ein 3,6 Prozent Anstieg des globalen Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP). Nach der WTO (WTO, 2011a) dürfte sich das Welthandelswachstum im Jahr 2011 auf 5,8 Prozent reduzieren, mit einem Anstieg des globalen BIP um 2,5 Prozent (siehe Abbildung 9.1). Überraschenderweise zeigte Asien das schnellste reale Exportwachstum von 23,1 Prozent, wobei die chinesischen und japanischen Exporte um 28,4 bzw. 27,5 Prozent anstiegen. Mittlerweile wuchs der Warenhandel um 10,8 Prozent in Europa und 15,4 Prozent in den USA. Die Gesamtentwicklungsländer und die Transformationsländer machten 45 Prozent der weltweiten Exporte aus, der höchste Anteil aller Zeiten (WTO, 2011a). 6 Steigende Rohstoffpreise und eine abwertende US-Währung führten dazu, dass das Handelswachstum in Dollar um 22 Prozent den Volumenanstieg übersteigt. Insbesondere Regionen, die auf natürliche Rohstoffexporte wie Afrika, den Mittleren Osten oder Südamerika angewiesen sind, erlebten ein geringeres Wachstum der Handelsvolumina, aber signifikante Erhöhungen des Dollarwertes ihrer Exporte. Die afrikanischen Exporte stiegen um 6,5 Prozent, aber um 28 Prozent in Dollar. Ebenso stiegen die lateinamerikanischen Exporte nur um 6,2 Prozent, aber um 25 Prozent in Dollar (WTO, 2011b). Abbildung 9.1 World Merchandise Exporte und BIP, 200811 (in Prozent Veränderung) Prozentuale Veränderung gegenüber dem gleichen Monat des Vorjahres. Quelle: WTO (2011b). 7 Mittlerweile stiegen die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (FDI) nach der Vereinten Nationen über Handel und Entwicklung (UNCTAD) von US1.185 auf 1.244 Billionen im Jahr 2010, was vor allem auf den gestiegenen Fluss in die Entwicklungsländer zurückzuführen ist, die zusammen mit den Transformationsländern, Entfielen mehr als die Hälfte der gesamten ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (UNCTAD, 2011). Die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen aus den aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaften erreichten auch Rekordhöhen, wobei die meisten ihrer Investitionen auf andere Länder im Süden gerichtet waren. 8 Während diese Zahlen eindrucksvoll aussehen, reichte der Umsatz im Jahr 2010 nicht aus, um die Exporte auf ein Niveau zurückzuhalten, das mit den 19902008-Trends übereinstimmt. Auf der Investitionsfront blieben die weltweiten FDI-Flüsse trotz einer Prognose von 5 Prozent im Vergleich zu 2009 niedriger als ihr Vor-Krisen-Durchschnitt (200507) und 37 Prozent unter ihrem Gipfel 2007 (UNCTAD, 2011). Und während die Schwellenländer in Lateinamerika und Südostasien ein rasantes Wachstum verzeichneten, flossen die Direktinvestitionen in den Industrieländern Afrika und Südasien weiter zusammen. 9 Im Allgemeinen, da die Weltproduktion im Jahr 2009 depressiv war, argumentiert die WTO, dass ein höheres Wachstum im Jahr 2010 zu erwarten sei, zumal das BIP-Wachstum in den letzten Jahren oftmals 4 Prozent oder mehr erreichte (WTO, 2011a). Mehrere Faktoren könnten erklären, warum Handel und Produktion langsamer wuchsen, als sie haben könnten. Im Jahr 2010 erhöhten die relativ hohen Ölpreise die Energiekosten für Haushalte und Unternehmen. Hohe Arbeitslosenquoten betrafen auch den Inlandsverbrauch und die Importnachfrage in den Industrieländern. Schließlich führten Versuche in Europa, den USA und anderswo zur Verringerung der Haushaltsdefizite zu Kürzungen bei den Ausgaben und Einnahmen und untergraben kurzfristige Wachstumsaussichten. Die negativen Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise und der globalen Rezession dürften daher trotz der Rekord-Rebound des Handels im Jahr 2010 noch einige Zeit bleiben. 10 In den USA haben sich die niedrigen nationalen Sparquoten und der hohe private Konsum als Anteil des BIP fortgesetzt Nachfrage nach importierten Konsumgütern, die in den aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaften ein rasches Exportwachstum auslösen. In den letzten 10 bis 15 Jahren haben diese Entwicklungen zu großen Ungleichgewichten geführt, wobei in den USA insbesondere erhebliche Leistungsbilanzdefizite anfallen und in anderen Ländern, insbesondere in China, Deutschland und Japan, große Leistungsbilanzüberschüsse bestehen. Diese haben wiederum politische Spannungen, die in der USChina Kontroverse über Wechselkurs Politik deutlich. Im Jahr 2010 blieben die Handelsungleichgewichte geringer als vor der Krise, aber für die meisten Länder, außer in China, hat sich die Kluft zwischen Exporten und Importen im Vergleich zu 2009 vergrößert (siehe Abb. 9.3 und 9.4). Wie Abbildung 9.2 zeigt, stieg das US-Handelsbilanzdefizit von rund US550 Milliarden auf US690 Milliarden an, blieb aber im Jahr 2008 niedriger als die US880 Milliarden. Inzwischen sank der Handelsüberschuss von Chinas von fast 300 Milliarden US-Dollar im Jahr 2008 auf knapp über 18 Milliarden US-Dollar im Jahr 2010. Im Jahr 2010 Hat sich das Handelsbilanzdefizit der Europäischen Union (EU) trotz des US-Dollar-Handelsüberschusses im US-Dollar um 200 Milliarden US-Dollar erweitert, obwohl das EU-Defizit geringer war als im Jahr 2008. Japan war eine Ausnahme von der allgemeinen Tendenz zu kleineren Ungleichgewichten als Handel Überschuss fast vervierfacht im Jahr 2010 im Vergleich zu Vorkrisenniveau. 11 Es besteht ein weitverbreiteter Konsens darüber, dass die derzeitigen Ungleichgewichte langfristig nicht nachhaltig sind. Das anhaltend hohe Niveau des Schuldenfinanzierten Haushaltsverbrauchs in den USA muss auf etwas niedrigere historische Werte zurückkehren (Mayer, 2011). Gleichzeitig haben niedrige Verbrauchsraten und hohe nationale Einsparungen in China aufgefordert, dass Peking den Binnenmarkt weiterentwickelt und sich allmählich von Investitionen und Ausfuhren in ein Konsumentenwachstum bewegt. Diese Trends dürften sowohl die Größe als auch die Zusammensetzung der globalen Nachfrage in den kommenden Jahren beeinflussen. Dies ist zum Teil deshalb möglich, weil der gestiegene chinesische Konsum einen möglichen Rückgang des US-Nachfragewachstums nicht vollständig kompensieren könnte, sondern auch, weil die beiden Volkswirtschaften dazu neigen, verschiedene Warenkörbe zu importieren, wobei China beispielsweise mehr Rohstoffe, Rohstoffe und Lebensmittel kauft. Sofern nicht andere Handelsüberschussländer wie Deutschland oder Japan ihren Inlandsverbrauch verstärken, werden die Veränderungen in der globalen Nachfrage erhebliche negative Auswirkungen auf die Exporte der Entwicklungsländer und auch auf die Beschäftigung insbesondere in den verarbeitenden Sektoren wie Textilien und Bekleidung haben (Mayer, 2011). Abbildung 9.2 Handelsungleichgewichte in ausgewählten Volkswirtschaften, 200810 (in US-Millionen) Quelle: WTO (2011b). 12 Der Südsee-Handel hat sich auch weiter ausgebaut und stellt nun rund 50 Prozent der Entwicklungsländer dar. Die afrikanischen Handelsvolumina mit ihren aufstrebenden Partnern haben sich im Laufe des Jahrzehnts nominal verdoppelt und belaufen sich nun auf 37 Prozent des Kontinents Gesamthandel (AFDB et al. 2011). Während China Afrikas führenden aufstrebenden Partner repräsentiert, hat die Summe der Kontinente, die mit den anderen aufstrebenden Partnern (wie der Türkei, Brasilien, Korea und Indien) tätig sind, mittlerweile noch größer als der Handel mit China. Während diese Entwicklungen neue Chancen bieten Exportmärkte, Technologietransfer, Hilfe und andere Formen der Kooperation Die afrikanischen Exporte in andere Entwicklungsländer konzentrieren sich weitgehend auf Primärprodukte, mit dem bisherigen Beweis, dass der SouthSouth-Handel einen realen Strukturwandel zur Folge hatte. Abbildung 9.3 Importexporte: USA und China, 200511 (in US-Millionen) 13 Abbildung 9.4 Importexporte: Deutschland und die EU, 200511 (in US-Millionen) Quelle: WTO (2011b). 14 Seit Januar 2010 hat die Doha-Runde weiter geplagt, mit den Fristen für den Abschluss der zehnjährigen Gespräche, die am Ende dieses Jahres und der nächsten verpasst wurden, und jetzt kein Ende in Sicht haben. Im Laufe des Jahres forderten die USA wiederholt die obligatorische Teilnahme an sektoralen Vereinbarungen für hergestellte Produkte, aufgrund von Schrägstrichen in einer ganzen Branche. Brasilien, China und Indien lehnten die Forderungen der USA nach den großen Schwellenländern ab, besondere Zuständigkeiten zu übernehmen, und bestritten Washingtons behaupten, dass der Entwurf von Texten im Dezember 2008 die US-amerikanischen Verpflichtungen über die USA unverzüglich bestrafen, um zu klären, welche konkreten Zugeständnisse Washington im Gegenzug für einen erhöhten Markt bieten könnte Zugriff. Inzwischen hat die G-33-Gruppe der Entwicklungsländer eine Reihe von Vorschlägen zugunsten eines starken besonderen Schutzmechanismus gemacht, den sie nutzen könnten, um die inländischen Landwirte von plötzlichen Einfuhrströmen oder Preisdepressionen zu verteidigen. Die USA und andere Exportländer bestanden weiterhin darauf, dass die Flexibilitäten der Entwicklungsländer das Wachstum des normalen Handels nicht untergraben sollten. 16 Nach einer viel gepriesenen, aber letztlich fruchtlosen Bestandsaufnahme im März 2010 trafen sich die Mitglieder für die meisten der verbleibenden Jahre in verschiedenen informellen bilateralen und plurilateralen Gruppen, die als variable Geometrie des WTO-Generaldirektors Pascal Lamy beschrieben wurden. In den Diskussionen über die Zusammenkünfte der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD) und der Asien-Pazifischen Wirtschaftskooperation (APEC) und auf der Tagesordnung der Gipfel der G-20-Gipfel von Gipfeltreffen und der Seoul-Gipfel der G-20-Gruppe Der führenden Volkswirtschaften nur für Beamte zu finden, dass die Interessen der großen Handelsmächte waren noch nicht nah genug für ein Doha-Deal in naher Zukunft geschlagen werden. Anfang 2011 haben Mexiko und Brasilien getrennte Vorschläge zum Bruch der Doha-Deadlocks, einschließlich möglicher Kompromisse zwischen getrennten Verhandlungsgebieten wie Landwirtschaft und Fertigwaren, eingereicht, die jedoch bei der globalen Handelsorganisation wenig Unterstützung fanden. In Anerkennung dessen, dass Lücken zunehmend schwer zu überbrücken waren, begannen die Handelsverhandler, Möglichkeiten für eine weiche Landung zu diskutieren. Die Freigabe von überarbeiteten Texten oder Arbeitsdokumenten im April 2011 bestätigte die Befürchtungen, dass der Fortschritt gestört worden war, wobei einige Verhandlungsgruppen-Stühle nur in der Lage waren, Status von Spielreports anstelle von neuen Entwürfen zu veröffentlichen. 17 Mitglieder begannen dann stille Diskussionen darüber, wie ein Plan B aussehen könnte. Der Plan wurde offiziell im Mai angekündigt: Die Mitglieder würden ein Mini-Paket abschließen, das sich auf die Bedenken der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder (LDCs) für das Dezember-Ministerium konzentrierte und auch einen Arbeitsplan zur Behebung anderer offener Fragen aufstellte. Auf der Beharrlichkeit der USA wurde das Paket erweitert, um auch Nicht-LDC-Themen zu berücksichtigen. Allerdings begann das Paket schnell zu entwirren, da die Mitglieder nicht in der Lage waren zu vereinbaren, welche LDC - und Nicht-LDC-Artikel enthalten sind. Consensus erwies sich als schwer zu den vier Hauptthemen, die die LDCs einbeziehen wollten: zollfreier zollfreier Zugang für ihre Ausfuhren, einen LDC-Dienstleistungsausweis, einen Schritt nach vorne auf Baumwolle und verbesserte Ursprungsregeln. Ebenso konnten sich die Handelsbefugnisse nicht auf die wachsende Zahl der vorgeschlagenen Nicht-LDC-Fragen einigen, die von Fischereiförderungen bis hin zu Handelserleichterungen und Exportwettbewerb reichen. 18 Im August hatte sich der Plan für das Ministertreffen im Dezember 2011 von der Herstellung eines LDC-Plus-Pakets verschoben: Die Mitglieder beschlossen stattdessen, sich auf Nicht-Doha-Themen und auf einen Arbeitsplan nach Dezember zu konzentrieren, um Doha abzuschließen Mögliche LDC-Ergebnisse. 19 Mehrere Faktoren erklären die Unfähigkeit der Mitglieder, die Handelsgespräche abzuschließen. Manche weisen darauf hin, dass der Verhandlungsprozess angesichts der wachsenden Vielfalt und der abwechslungsreichen Erwartungen der WTO-153-Länder-Mitgliedschaft zu politisch und komplex geworden ist. Andere beschuldigen den Aufstieg der aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaften wie Brasilien, China und Indien, zusammen mit mehr durchsetzungsfähigen Entwicklungsländer Koalitionen. Andere verknüpfen es noch mit der globalen Finanzkrise und den jüngsten häuslichen Schwierigkeiten in der EU und den USA, die diese Länder daran gehindert haben, eine Führungsrolle bei den WTO-Verhandlungen ausüben zu können. Schließlich haben sich die Länderpositionen und Verhandlungsinteressen im Laufe der Zeit verändert, was heute die geopolitische Dynamik widerspiegelt. Alle diese Faktoren sind relevant, aber Kritiker weisen zunehmend auf einen grundsätzlichen Fehler im System hin, der sich auf die Art und Weise bezieht, in der Verhandlungen durchgeführt werden. Einige Beobachter haben daher argumentiert, dass eine gründliche Reform des Systems erforderlich ist, um die aktuelle Lähmung zu überwinden. 20 Andere bemerken, dass es nicht unbedingt die institutionellen Verfahren der WTO ist, die die Organisation gelähmt haben, sondern vielmehr die Art und Weise, wie sich die Mitglieder für ihre Regeln und Praktiken entschieden haben (Rodriguez Mendoza und Wilke, 2011 Rolland, 2010). In der Tat argumentieren einige Experten, dass die WTO als Modell-Governance-System auf internationaler Ebene gedient hat, vor allem wegen ihres automatischen und durchsetzbaren Streitbeilegungssystems. Darüber hinaus wird durch die Reihe von Regeln und Disziplinen argumentiert, dass die WTO auch bei der Verhütung protektionistischer Tendenzen während der Wirtschaftskrise erfolgreich war. 1 Der Warwick Bericht. Zum Beispiel bietet eine der bemerkenswertesten und umfangreichsten Bestandsaufnahme e (.) 21 Dennoch diskutieren sie über die institutionelle Reform, ob es nötig ist, in welcher Form und über welche Art von Prozess seit der Errichtung der WTO fortgesetzt wurde (Deere - Birbeck und Monagle, 2009). Im Jahr 2003, nach dem Scheitern der Cancn Ministerkonferenz, Pascal Lamy dann EU-Handelskommissar qualifizierte die WTO als mittelalterlich und forderte seine Entscheidungsfindung zu überarbeiten (Lamy, 2003). In den vergangenen Jahren haben verschiedene Akteure vorgeschlagen, praktisch alle Aspekte der WTOs, die von Management und Verwaltung funktionieren, durch die Durchführung von Handelsverhandlungen und Streitbeilegung, den Aufbau von Kapazitäten und die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Institutionen oder der breiten Öffentlichkeit (Deere-Birbeck und Monagle) zu reformieren , 2009). Die Ziele hinter diesen Vorschlägen und das Tempo der vorgeschlagenen Reformen waren gleichermaßen vielfältig und gehen von inkrementellen Verbesserungen zu radikalen Veränderungen in der Art und Weise, wie die Institution funktioniert. Während einige Vorschläge von Regierungen eingeführt wurden, wurden andere von Hochschulen, Forschungsinstituten, Zivilgesellschaft und anderen internationalen Organisationen vorgestellt.1 Das multilaterale System selbst war angesichts dieser Forderungen nicht statisch. Reformen oder inkrementelle Änderungen sind auf einer Reihe von Fronten geschehen, auch auf Führungsebene, in externer Transparenz, Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung im Streitbeilegungsverfahren oder in der Art und Weise, in der Verhandlungen durchgeführt werden (Deere-Birbeck und Monagle, 2009). Es gibt jedoch divergierende Ansichten über die Erwünschtheit und Auswirkungen dieser Veränderungen und darüber, ob sie weit genug gehen. 2 Als die Regierungen die Uruguay-Runde der Handelsverhandlungen im Rahmen des GATT im Jahr 1986 starteten, war die Deklaration (.) 22 Die Debatte löste ein neues Interesse als Mitglieder, die für das Ministertreffen im November 2009 vorbereitet wurden. Nach zehn Jahren komplexer Verhandlungen, gekennzeichnet durch verpasste Fristen und wenige substanzielle Dividenden, haben Kritiker argumentiert, dass die Bodys Regeln, Grundsätze und Praktiken der Entscheidungsfindung, die aus dem Allgemeinen Zoll - und Handelsabkommen (GATT) übertragen wurden, 2 einfach sind Unangemessen für die schnell wandelnden Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. Manche argumentieren sogar, dass das GATTWTOs-Goldene Dreieck der Entscheidungsfindung die Dominanz der Vertragsparteien, das Konsenssprinzip und die Logik des einzelnen Unternehmens nicht in der Lage sind, die Herausforderungen der modernen globalen Handelsregierung zu bewältigen (Cottier und Elsig, 2009). 23 Die Stärkung des WTO-Verhandlungsverfahrens erfordert die Ausgewogenheit von drei konkurrierenden Forderungen: Eine größere Effizienz bei der Verhandlungsführung hat die Legitimität verstärkt, und zwar durch eine bessere Bewältigung der Belange der öffentlichen Ordnung und eine stärkere Einbeziehung, um so die Machtasymmetrien zu überwinden und die gegenseitig vorteilhaften Ergebnisse zu fördern. The following sections review some of the criticism and the proposed reform options for the WTOs conduct of negotiations in light of these objectives. 3 The consensus principle dates back to the International Trade Organization (ITO) and with it the e (. ) 4 With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the DSU, the conduct, conclusion and (. ) 24 WTO negotiations are guided by the consensus principle and by the idea that they represent a single undertaking . Consensus is not interpreted as requiring unanimity however,3 if no present member state objects, consensus is assumed. The single undertaking, on the other hand, requires that all areas are negotiated and adopted by all parties at the same time .4 Both principles derive directly from the WTOs nature as a member-driven organisation. With the secretariat assuming an almost marginal role and the consensus principle on the basis of sovereign equality permeating all areas and functions of the organisation, the dominance of contracting parties is its main characteristic. 25 Each concept can be seen as a double-edged sword. The consensus principle is important for developing countries as, in theory, it guarantees that every member can veto any decisions, irrespective of its political or economic power. The single undertaking, on the other hand, has supported developing countries on numerous occasions, for instance when a group of Latin American members halted the establishment of the WTO until certain concessions of vital interest to developing countries had been made (Croome, 1995). 26 Both pillars nonetheless need to be seen in the context of the overarching power asymmetries at the WTO. In practice, wealthier nations can hold trade talks hostage more easily than poorer ones, because of the fact that they are better able to withstand political pressure to join a consensus even against great opposition (Steinberg, 2002 Cottier and Elsig, 2009 Low, 2009). The consensus principle is thus less about the actual consensual adoption of a final decision than about the process of consensus-building (Ismail and Vickers, 2011). The largest trading nations therefore bear particular responsibility for helping countries to reach agreement by guiding the process of consensus-building and facilitating an atmosphere of compromise. Ismail and Vickers thus note that, in the Doha round, developed countries also share considerable blame even responsibility for frustrating the process of consensus-building. It is disturbing that critics of the consensus principle raise efficiency concerns only when smaller developing countries and larger emerging economies (e. g. Brazil, China, India and South Africa) do not join the consensus of the developed countries (Ismail and Vickers, 2011). 27 This is similarly true for the single undertaking and the use of linkages to condition concessions in one area to progress in others. While in principle these could foster compromises by focusing negotiators attention on the greatest gains, in practice members tend to overemphasise the losses (Van Grasstek and Sauv, 2006). This is particularly true for the current round, where negotiators do not seek to establish linkages systematically with a view to achieving long-term benefits, but focus instead on achieving short-term gains for tactical reasons (Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke, 2011). The introduction of linkages prevents certain areas from moving ahead independent of progress in others. As a result, even small deals cannot be reached, as new proposals prompt further linkages. 28 Proposals to reform those two core negotiating principles (Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, 2009) can be summarised in two categories: those introducing different voting systems, and those relating to variable geometry agreements including so-called plurilateral and critical mass agreements. 5 Note that weighted voting at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on (. ) 29 Proposals on weighted voting (one suggestion for reforming the consensus principle) and critical mass agreements share a common idea. Power be it for voting, agenda setting or participation in negotiations would reflect a countrys economic significance. The allocation of votes could thus reflect a countrys share in global trade, GDP or the level of market openness. Some experts also suggest taking into account country size or population, arguing that this would ensure power is shared fairly among developed, emerging and other developing countries (Cottier and Takenoshita, 2008 Elsig, 2009). However, experience with weighted voting approaches in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank show that the approach can easily manifest real power asymmetries rather than overcoming imbalances (Warwick Commission, 2007).5 30 The current voting system does not suffer from a large group of small countries blocking negotiations, but instead from a handful of powerful countries that are unable to reach agreement among themselves. The alternative, a simple majority vote, could be difficult to introduce as it would undermine the currently powerful position of developed countries by enabling groups of smaller countries to overrule them. Experience in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly indicates that many countries would systematically oppose the introduction of a simple majority vote (Anghie, 2005). 31 The concept of variable geometry agreements is an alternative to the single undertaking. Plurilateral agreements, for example, have already been used in the past. Here, the participation of all WTO members is not required in order to strike a deal and interested members are free to join the negotiation or not. Several experts have suggested reviving and enhancing this approach (Consultative Board, 2004 Elsig, 2008). The critical mass approach is slightly different in the sense that it requires that participating members represent at least a critical mass or a certain threshold of a sector under negotiation based on their collective level of economic activity, production, consumption or exports (Jackson, 2001). Supporters argue that the inclusion of import share in the threshold would ensure that critical mass agreements could not be misused by exporters to harmonise their export systems to the detriment of importers an issue they consider to be of increasing importance as, for instance, high-technology producing countries face shortages in needed raw materials that are extracted in only a handful of countries (ICTSD, 2011d). Proposed thresholds range from 75 to 90 per cent. Proponents argue that the threshold could further be coupled with the requirement to include at least a minimum number of countries. If constructed in a sensitive way, supporters suggest, this second requirement could ensure the legitimacy of a particular critical mass rather than only its efficiency. The Warwick Commission, for instance, notes that a positive global welfare benefit, to protect the principle of non-discrimination, and to accommodate explicitly the income distribution effects of rule-making would need to be part of a critical mass consideration, in particular when it relates to the formation of an agenda (Warwick Commission, 2007, 3). 32 It needs to be cautioned, however, that most of the proposals for a critical mass approach focus on negotiations on downstream modalities and concessions (basically market access), thus limiting thresholds to purely economic considerations. As the WTO moves towards addressing a greater array of trade-related policies, such a critical mass concept might be inappropriate. Small countries, for instance, may not have a particular export or import trade share in a certain sector and are thus not indispensable for a critical mass, yet they would be critically affected by any new rules be this on agriculture commodities or new regulation on services trade. This is particularly true as trends in rule-making increasingly serve as a reference for legal interpretation and new regulatory approaches are used as a reference and argument in non-related yet similar negotiations. Each negotiation is thus also about shaping global policy and law trends. 6 The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as (. ) 33 Another aspect that continues to be disputed among the supporters of a critical mass approach is the most favoured nation (MFN) character of the final agreements. Current plurilateral WTO agreements (where no critical mass was required) only apply among the members that have signed them.6 If further strengthened, this approach has the potential to turn the WTO into an umbrella organisation facilitating group arrangements while losing its multilateral and thus participatory and inclusive character. To meet this concern, alternative proposals suggest extending the rights and benefits deriving from critical mass agreements on an MFN basis to all WTO members (Warwick Commission, 2007). This could preserve the multilateral character of the WTO and thus its integrity while supporting fast-track negotiations. 34 However, even the latter construct raises certain questions. First, assuming that a given sector was irrelevant for a particular country at the time when a critical mass negotiation was concluded, it remains unclear how the country could be induced to join the agreement if the benefits already apply on an MFN basis. Also, it is unclear whether a country would be required to join the existing agreement or whether there would be an option to renegotiate the terms (Harbinson, 2009). If no changes were allowed, powerful groups could now conclude agreements that become relevant for developing countries only at a later stage, thus indirectly imposing their terms and conditions. Criticisms regarding a trend towards WTO-plus commitments in FTAs and the fear over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) introducing a new global benchmark for the protection of intellectual property come to mind in this respect (ICTSD, 2008b). 35 While some of the proposals discussed above might be promising, neither a review of the voting procedures nor a critical mass approach in isolation of other reforms seem to have the potential to fully achieve the three objectives of WTO reform, namely, efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. Instead, if implemented in their simplest form, both concepts risk excluding smaller countries and exacerbating power asymmetries. Also, none of the proposed reforms would be likely to resolve the current deadlock in the Doha round which results, to a large extent, from political differences rather than weak procedural rules. In this respect, some critics have challenged the member-driven nature of the institution. They argue that a stronger WTO secretariat could be useful, particularly in times where members fail to initiate needed deliberations or where discussions are paralysed by individual member states political actions. If members are not prepared to defend and promote the principles they subscribed to, then the Secretariat must be free to do so, the Sutherland report noted already in 2004 (Consultative Board, 2004). 7 See for instance the 2003 Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participati (. ) 36 Such proposals, however, need to be seen in the light of already existing criticism over a too powerful and partial WTO secretariat. The same stakeholders fear that strengthening the secretariat could create a strong institution following its own internal agenda.7 Consequentially, the challenge would be a strong, yet neutral secretariat. Proponents agree that this could only be guaranteed if member states were to ensure a constant participation and oversight. Efforts on strengthening the secretariat would thus focus primarily on increased political support by member states rather than a budgetary increase or a mandate extension as advocated by others. The idea behind this is to redirect but not replace the preponderant role of member states, i. e. to strengthen the WTO through increased policy deliberation among its members. 8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon (. ) 37 One important starting point could be the election process of the Director General (Consultative Board, 2004 Steger, 2009). This process provides a critical opportunity to reflect on the most pressing challenges facing the organisation. If candidates were to take a strong position while countries provided them with clear indications on what is expected over the coming term, directors would receive a strong mandate to lead and guide even in critical times (Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, 2009, 74). The current practice of nodding through rather than electing a new Director General, without any internal and external reflection process, on the other hand, weakens the position of the Director General, the member states and the WTO as an institution (Keohane and Nye, 2000). A second point of entry could be the regular Ministerial Conferences. If members used the meetings to reflect on the standing of the WTO, the way forward and the actions expected in the coming years, the secretariat could guide the organisation accordingly over the coming months. In fact Ministerial Conferences were originally meant to provide for such a forum. Only with the launch of the Doha Round they have turned into pure negotiation gatherings. Numerous developing countries have consistently criticised this development.8 38 As described above, there has been no shortage of thoughtful ideas and recommendations from a variety of different sources and study groups. But some critics argue that these ideas have gone nowhere because they have had no process to feed into. Currently only one set of proposals is being discussed in a formalised manner at the WTO, namely those related to dispute settlement (WTO, 1999b). As foreseen by the original WTO agreements a special session of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has been reviewing related reform proposals since 1997. Formally it proceeds outside of the Doha Round and is not part of the single undertaking. In practice, however, the review is used as a trade-off opportunity in the Doha Round which has prevented any conclusion over the last 14 years. To allow for a proper debate, other reform proposals will also need to be addressed in a formalised process at the WTO. Such a process would probably need to involve and engage trade ministers themselves to generate sufficient credibility and political traction. Ideally, the process should be co-chaired and co-owned by a developing and a developed country trade minister. 39 At the same time, the experience of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) review shows that any reform discussion must be de-linked from trade negotiations. Enforcing such an objective and non-concession-based discussion could be easier if various reform proposals were debated in a joint forum with a common objective and a single plan of action. Moreover, a joint process would facilitate the coordination of different reforms ensuring that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the WTO do not develop in opposite directions but are mutually supportive. 40 A first opportunity to initiate such a process was missed at the 7th Ministerial Conference, in December 2009, essentially due to a lack of political will to push this agenda through. During the preparatory process and under the leadership of India, 18 developed and developing countries had proposed to address the need for an institutional reform in a formalised and long-term manner. The coalition, backed by almost the entire WTO membership, called upon the WTO to periodically engage in a process of review of its functioning, efficiency and transparency and upon the member states to consider systemic improvements, as appropriate. to establish an appropriate deliberative process to review the organizations functioning, efficiency and transparency and consider possible improvements, while bearing in mind the high priority attached to the successful conclusion of the DDA Doha Development Agenda negotiation (WTO, 2009). 41 However, the proposal was dropped from consideration following opposition from Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela ( ICTSD. 2009). An earlier communication submitted by India in summer 2009, entitled Strengthening the WTO, likewise remained without further consideration ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009). These missed opportunities further aggravate the dilemma of the WTO as political guidance becomes hampered at the very first stage ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009). If the secretariat assumed a more active role in preparing ministerial conferences and guiding towards processes as those called upon by the country coalition, initial opposition might be overcome. As a formal forum for discussing reform proposals continues to be missing, this could be the first step towards reform. 42 Beyond institutional reform, the current paralysis in the Doha Round is affecting the ability of the system to address pressing global challenges. Over the last 17 years, public perceptions of the organisations relevance and legitimacy have greatly depended on the degree to which it can credibly claim to be responding effectively to broader public policy demands in areas such as food security, environmental protection, labour standards and, more recently, the transition towards a low-carbon economy. However, the difficulty the WTO has experienced in bringing its troubled Doha Round talks to a successful conclusion is arguably hampering its ability to respond and adapt meaningfully to new public policy challenges. 43 From its inception in 1994 as an organisation outside the UN system, the WTO has consistently been obliged to demonstrate that its decision-making processes, rules and negotiating outcomes are consistent with broader public policy goals in the areas of health, the environment or development, to name but a few. While calls for greater policy coherence have often come from the governments that constitute the membership of the global trade body, they have also come from civil society groups, the media and even from other intergovernmental agencies concerned with the relationship between trade and public policy objectives. 9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in (. ) 44 The evolution in the way in which food security concerns are addressed at the WTO can serve to illustrate the organisations attempt to take wider public policy goals into account.9 It also demonstrates the challenges that remain in establishing policy coherence with other global governance mechanisms, and in responding to the scale and ambition of the aspirations and commitments that governments have agreed to in the post-war period (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, art. 25 1 966, art. 11 2000, goal 1) (FAO, 1996, para. 2). 45 At the global level, evolving consumption patterns, combined with demographic changes, urbanisation and low agricultural productivity growth, are widely expected to mean that regional and international trade will play an increased role in many developing countries food security strategies. Combined with increased investment in agriculture, international trade mighthelp offset future climate-induced production decreases in certain regions, ensuring that local populations can purchase food that may be unavailable in sufficient quantities through domestic production. 10 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficie (. ) 46 Two years before the 1996 World Food Summit agreed on a landmark definition10 of food security that is still widely used and accepted today, the concept was mentioned in the preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture at the end of the Uruguay Round, and in some paragraphs within the text of the accord. These included provisions dealing with export prohibitions and restrictions (article 12), subsidies for public stockholding for food security purposes (Annex 2, para. 3) and a clause permitting exemptions to be made from market access binding and reduction commitments (Annex 5, para. 1d). However, while food security is also related to numerous other aspects of the agreement, such as subsidy reform or market access considerations, it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the text. 11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country Like Minded Group (23 June 2000), GAGN (. ) 47 As governments concluded the Agreement on Agriculture, they also finalised the Marrakech Decision (WTO, 1999c) on least developed and net-food importing developing countries, supposedly intended to ensure that these countries would remain able to purchase food from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions. The decision has since been widely criticised by developing countries, who have argued that loopholes in the text prevent them from requiring developed countries and the international financial institutions to implement its provisions.11 Essentially, the decision characterises the challenge that net food-importing countries could face as a trade and balance-of-payments problem rather than a food security problem, and provides a fairly limited set of solutions centring mainly on the provision of food aid. 48 Arguably, the way in which food security concerns have been approached in the multilateral trading system has evolved considerably since the end of the Uruguay Round, along with the way in which other public policy goals have been treated. In the years running up to the 2001 Doha ministerial conference, developing country governments expressed growing concern that they were ill-equipped to implement the Uruguay Round agreements, that the provisions of these agreements undermined domestic food security, or as in the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that they had signed on to texts which affected their food security without fully understanding the practical and legal implications that might result. In some cases, these concerns were also echoed by development agencies and campaign groups, farmers organisations, research centres, academic experts and the staff of various intergovernmental organisations. 12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka (. ) 13 India (15 January 2001), GAGNGW102, wto. orgenglishtratopeagricenegsbkgrnd02p (. ) 14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause (. ) 49 In the summer following the WTOs Seattle ministerial conference in 1999, a cross-regional group of 11 developing countries known as the Like-Minded Group submitted a proposal12 for a development box, under the built-in agenda of negotiations foreseen in article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The sponsors called for a development box that would aim to increase food security and food accessibility by allowing developing countries to select which products would be disciplined under the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture allowing developing countries to re-evaluate and adjust their tariff levels provide greater flexibility for developing countries to use limited amounts of trade-distorting support under the de minimis provision (WTO, 1999a, art. 6.4) and allowing developing countries to use the special safeguard clause. Measures to reform developed country subsidies and tariffs were also included as part of the same proposal. The Indian government echoed many of these proposals in an early 2001 submission13 calling for the establishment of a food security box, which also contemplated measures to reform rules on green box subsidies.14 Several of the elements outlined in the development box proposal were later to appear, in modified form, in subsequent negotiating submissions and texts. 50 The Doha declaration launching a new round of trade talks dubbed the Doha Development Agenda by the WTO also made explicit reference to food security goals. It stated that developing countries would be accorded special and differential treatment so as to enable them to take account effectively of their development needs, including food security and rural development (WTO, 2001, para. 13). Such treatment was to be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations, the declaration said, in language that was to be echoed in a large number of negotiating proposals submitted in the years that were to follow. 15 Substantial improvements in market access reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms o (. ) 51 The dozens of proposals that invoked food security during the Doha Round, and in the years immediately before its launch, can be roughly divided into a handful of broad, non-exhaustive categories, largely reflecting the emphasis of the agriculture negotiations on four main areas15 : 52 On market access, many developing countries sought to be granted greater flexibility on tariff commitments, and access to an agricultural safeguard that would allow themselves to shield producers from the effects of import surges or price depressions. 16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduc (. ) 53 Food security concerns were discussed in relation to trade-distorting support in general, but were also given particular attention in proposals for reform of the WTOs green box, and for maintaining or expanding article 6.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.16 54 The issue of food security also arose in negotiations on proposed new disciplines governing the provision of food aid, and in debates on export credits and other export competition issues. 55 Finally, importing countries in particular raised questions and concerns over food security in proposals on export restrictions (including export taxes and export prohibitions). 56 In each of these areas, different political constituencies and country grouping were active in seeking concessions. 17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)65) 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)91) 12 Oct 2005 (. ) 57 On special products and the special safeguard mechanism, a group of import-sensitive developing countries that came to be known as the G-33 argued in favour of greater flexibility on market access disciplines, on the basis that this was needed to safeguard the livelihoods, food security and longer-term development of their rural populations, including large numbers of small-scale producers that would be ill-equipped to compete with industrialised (and often also subsidised) agriculture elsewhere in the world.17 Analysis by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the South Centre including country level studies helped contribute to the evolution of countries negotiating positions on these issues (Mably, 2007 Wolfe, 2009 ICTSDFAO, 2007 Matthews, 2011). 18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)135) 3 May 2006 (JOB(0 (. ) 58 The G-33 proposed allowing developing countries to designate a limited set of products as special based on objective indicators of food security, livelihood security and rural development. Such indicators included, for example, the share of local income spent on a particular product, employment by product, productivity levels, rates of self-sufficiency, or the contribution of a product to local nutrition. Based on this country-specific analysis the tariffs of the selected products would then qualify for gentler reduction under the Doha Round, or would even be exempt from any cuts. The G-33, however, encountered opposition to their proposals from developed countries seeking greater access to developing country markets, such as the US, but also from exporting developing countries, such as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.18 Controversy over the special safeguard mechanism played a significant role in the breakdown of talks in July 2008 (ICTSD, 2008a). 59 Despite the disagreements in this area, the debate over special products in particular probably represents the most sophisticated attempt at defining food and livelihood security concerns in the WTO and how they relate to international trade. It is also symptomatic of how the discussion evolved over time in the trade body from a fairly narrow understanding of food security to a highly complex and differentiated approach based on indicators. 19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)187). 60 Food security concerns were also given particular attention in the review of the criteria for green box subsidies, as well as in the negotiations on domestic support more generally. The African Group (a group of developing countries that seeks reform of developed country agriculture), along with the G-20, has sought to expand the flexibility that the green box allows developing countries in being able to use domestic support to pursue national development goals.19 Among other things, these proposals would involve modifying the language on support for public stockholding for food security purposes so as to remove the existing requirement that developing countries count purchases from low-income or resource-poor producers towards their aggregate measure of support (AMS) an upper ceiling which would be reduced as part of the Doha Round negotiations. 61 In addition to proposals favouring greater flexibility for developing countries to subsidise their own agriculture sectors, two other main trends can be identified in the discussions on green box reform and in the debate over domestic support more generally (Hepburn and Bellmann, 2009). The first of these is the concern expressed by the G-2020 and by efficient agricultural exporters in the Cairns Group, which have argued that trade-distorting support undermines competitiveness and food security in countries that do not subsidise their agricultural sectors.21 These countries have also argued that green box programmes may be causing more than minimal trade distortion, and called for the criteria for these payments to be tightened.22 The other major trend is characterised by the proposals of countries with highly protected and heavily subsidised agricultural sectors, which have resisted such demands. These countries which include Japan23 and others in the G-10 coalition, as well as, to a lesser extent, the EU24 have instead historically called for greater flexibility to allow WTO members to address non-trade concerns, including food security. 25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to m (. ) 26 6 March 2006 (TNAGGEN13). 27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)122). 28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)78). 62 Food security was also debated extensively in the negotiations over new rules on food aid. In exchange for agreeing, at the WTOs Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, to the elimination of export subsidies, the EU had pressed trading partners to adopt disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect including food aid.25 At the heart of the debate was the notion that in-kind food aid or practices such as monetisation have sometimes disrupted local food markets and affected local producers. While members agreed that a safe box would cover bona fide emergency situations, they also agreed to introduce rules that would prevent aid from undermining local producers in non-emergency situations. A proposal from the African and LDC groups26 formed the basis for negotiations, with further contributions from the European Community27 and the US28 the worlds major provider of in-kind food aid (ICTSD, 2006). 29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (GAGNGW93) Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)164) Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (. ) 63 While the impact of export restrictions on food security has been a concern of various WTO members since the start of the Doha Round,29 debate and controversy over this issue has recently intensified, as two episodes of unusually high food prices and predictions of a long-term upward price trend for agricultural products increase the pressure on food importing countries, especially in the developing world (ICTSD, 2010, 2011b, c). While net-food-importing countries have drawn on analysis (FAO et al. 2011) by FAO staff and other experts to argue that export restrictions endanger food security by exacerbating shortages and volatility on world markets, exporting countries have thus far resisted any attempts to introduce more systemic disciplines in this area that go beyond the relatively limited disciplines set out in the Agreement on Agriculture or contemplated in the latest draft Doha agriculture accord. In part, this may be because of the role such measures play in supporting a strategy of enhancing value-addition in the exporting countries agriculture sector, and partly because of concerns that they could serve a useful role in responding to potential domestic food shortages. However, possibly more important is a more generalised reluctance on the part of exporting countries to make concessions in the absence of more far-reaching disciplines on trade distortions on the import side. 64 Despite the post-2008 stalemate in the WTOs Doha process, the same price trends and projections have helped to push food security back towards the top of the agenda in a number of political and policy-making processes, with the role of trade receiving some attention in this context. A series of high-level meetings the G-8s meeting in LAquila in 2008, the FAOs World Summit on Food Security in 2009 and the G-20 gathering of agriculture ministers in 2011 reflected the increased political importance being accorded to the question. However, while heads of state and ministers reaffirmed the importance of access to markets and pledged their commitment to raise agricultural productivity by boosting aid and investment, the WTO continues to be seen as the sole forum where concrete market access and subsidy commitments can be made. Even where agreement on trade-related measures has been reached, such as the G-20s June 2011 accord on exempting humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions, governments have recommended that further action be taken at the WTO (ICTSD, 2011a). Other trade-related issues such as biofuel subsidies have proven to be too controversial to be addressed meaningfully by the G-8 or G-20 (Tangermann, 2011), leaving their food security implications unresolved for the time being. 65 The establishment of the UNs High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis , the elaboration of its Comprehensive Framework of Action and the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CWFS) were significant steps in the effort to improve global governance and enhance policy coherence in this area. The WTO, FAO and eight other relevant bodies also collaborated around the inter-agency report to the G-20 in the first half of 2011 (FAO et al. 2011). However, much more could still be done in this regard. Recent suggestions have included ensuring that the WTO Committee on Agriculture takes a more active role in reviewing food security issues related to trade, and strengthening the collaboration between the CWFS, the WTO, the World Bank and the Rome-based institutions (Ahmad, 2011). Reforming and improving the international governance framework is a necessary step towards overcoming current shortcomings on trade and food security, even though by itself it will not be sufficient to do so. 66 Measures to enhance policy coherence and to reform governance structures at the international level will, however, need to be accompanied by similar moves at the domestic level, especially in key countries. The disconnect between governance mechanisms responsible for development and aid, for the environment and for agricultural policy can mean that, for example, EU or US policies on farm subsidies may be at odds with policies pursued on related issues such as climate or poverty. Furthermore, to a great extent, the geopolitical tensions between countries and blocs that have thwarted progress on international trade issues are mirrored by similar tensions on climate change, food security and development issues more generally. Behind these lie configurations of domestic interests and political constituencies at the national and sub-national level. The shifting global economic landscape of the last decade has thrown up new opportunities and threats for different actors, in developed countries as well as in the so-called emerging countries of the developing world, and created new challenges for the worlds poorest people whether they live in the group of countries that the UN officially recognises as LDCs, or elsewhere. 67 Even among trade negotiators, there is a growing awareness that the multilateral trading system is proving increasingly incapable of demonstrating that it is flexible and adaptable enough to prove its relevance in a changing world. At the same time, negotiators are reluctant to abandon the investment that has been made in elaborating a package of farm trade disciplines that are perceived to go some way towards restructuring an agricultural trading system that has been heavily criticised for failing to deliver on a range of global public policy goals, including food security. Any decision to abandon the Doha talks, or place them in deep freeze, would arguably leave a large Doha-shaped hole: current patterns of trade-distorting support and tariff protection would remain unchanged, in addition to the new trade and food security challenges that are emerging. Until countries are able to resolve the growing contradictions between domestic policies on trade, food security, climate and international development, there is little prospect of achieving greater policy coherence in these areas at the global level. 68 The WTO is not what it used to be a decade or so ago. Many new developing countries have since joined, and shifts in the balance of global economic and political power have transformed the playing field. Accordingly, new needs and different expectations have emerged, including demands on the decision-making processes, and their fairness and transparency. As described above, modern global trade governance requires a careful balance between greater efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. These objectives are not incompatible, but would require WTO members to move from essentially promoting their individual short-term mercantilist interests to developing a shared vision to effectively advance global public policy goals. Numerous proposals have been put forward to strengthen the multilateral trading system. But as for any intergovernmental institution, change must come, and be agreed to, from the inside. This calls for the establishment of an inclusive and bottom-up process, one that seeks input from all WTO members, as well as seeking submissions from the different actors in the international trade community. Only with such a process will ideas have a realistic chance to be considered, and be transformed into agents for strengthening the system. 69 Years of near-exclusive focus on the Doha Round have inhibited institutional evolution and even diminished some of the WTOs permanent, non-negotiating functions such as the work of the regular committees. Beyond the WTO negotiating function, there might be therefore merit in strengthening the work of the regular WTO committees. In the run-up to the 2009 Ministerial Conference, several such proposals were put on the table, notably by India.30 These covered a variety of issues such as the need to enhance the WTO trade information system by including data on non-tariff barriers monitor developments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and develop non-binding best practice guidelines for negotiating new RTAs establish an omnibus legal system that would address all forms of preferential market access for LDCs in a coherent way address the increasing role of standards and standard-setting bodies in international trade. Many of these proposals are still relevant today. 70 Finally, in parallel with efforts to revive the Doha Round, members could undertake work on a number of pressing global challenges. These could include concerns around the trade dimension of food security, food prices and export restrictions the potential trade impacts of emerging domestic policies designed to combat climate change or highly controversial matters around exchange rate policies and current trade imbalances. This is not to say that the WTO should become the sole or even primary body to deal with these matters. Several other institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), FAO or IMF have indeed a major role to play in this area. The WTO, as the main organisation dealing with trade rules, should nevertheless contribute to addressing them insofar as they are linked to trade. Willingness to do so has already been expressed by a wide and cross-cutting segment of the WTO membership, but as a first step it might be more realistic to address these issues in a non-negotiating setting. In doing so, members could assess whether the WTO rule book is properly equipped to deal with emerging challenges or whether existing disciplines need to be clarified or amended. Existing institutional structures such as the Committee on Agriculture could be used for such an exercise. Precedents for doing so already exist. Singapore, for example, has recently made a submission to the regular session of the Committee on Trade and Environment to embark on work examining possible trade applications of border tax adjustment as a way to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns in climate change. Such an approach would enable the system to address challenges of the twenty-first century and prepare the ground for future negotiations when the political situation is ripe. 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WTMIN(05)DEC (Hong Kong: WTO). WTO (2009) Strengthening the WTO . WTMIN(09)W1, Communication from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong China, European Communities, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, United States and Uruguay (Geneva: WTO). WTO (2011a) World Trade Report 2011. The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (Geneva: WTO). WTO (2011b) Quarterly World Merchandise Trade by Region and Selected Economies (Geneva: WTO), wto. orgenglishresestatisequarterlyworldexpe. htm (accessed on 8 November 2011). 1 The Warwick Report . for example, provides one of the most notable and comprehensive stock-taking exercises produced by non-governmental experts (Warwick Commission, 2007). Another critical milestone in this debate was the report commissioned in 2003 by Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, then Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to a panel of experts chaired by the former Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Peter Sutherland, on The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium. Despite its comprehensive analysis and concrete recommendations, the Sutherland Report was, however, criticised as a defence of the status quo . produced by insiders, thus lacking novel approaches (Hufbauer, 2005 Pauwelyn, 2005). As such it did not provide the necessary impetus to initiate a structured discussion among members. 2 When governments launched the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT in 1986, the declared aim was not to establish a standing global organisation on trade governance. What later became the WTO, only emerged over the last few months of the almost eight years lasting negotiations. When members realised that the trade package to be presented at the end of the negotiation round would include new areas such as intellectual property rights and services, the need arose to discuss processes and structures that would ensure the coherence of these different agreements. The decision to establish the WTO finally stemmed from that discussion and other related considerations in the negotiation Group on the Functioning of the GATT (FOGS). Since no systemic, long-term negotiations had taken place on a potential international organisation, most agreements (with the exception of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which had been revised completely during the Uruguay Round) thus replicate the principles that have served that GATT for the last five decades. Moreover, when members launched the ongoing Doha Round they referred back to the negotiation principles used during the Uruguay Round, namely the principles of consensus and single undertaking. See Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke (2011). 3 The consensus principle dates back to the International Trade Organization (ITO) and with it the early beginnings of the GATT. See Ismail and Vickers (2011). 4 With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the DSU, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations (WTO, 2001, para. 47). 5 Note that weighted voting at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on the level of a countrys financial contribution to the organisations budget. Currently the United States holds roughly 17 per cent of the votes, with the G-7 holding a total of 45 per cent. WTO-related proposals certainly differ from this, yet there are important lessons to be learnt from the World Banks and IMFs experience with power-based voting. 6 The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them (WTO, 1999d, Article II:3). 7 See for instance the 2003 Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participation in the WTO by the Third World Network, Oxfam International, Public Services International, World Wildlife Fund International, The Center for International Environmental Law, Focus on the Global South, The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, The Africa Trade Network, The International General and Trade Network, and the Tebtebba International Centre for Indigenous Peoples Rights, 13 July 2003. 8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon the WTO members to not confuse the Ministerial with various kinds of negotiation sessions. There would be no justification for continuing to postpone the regular revocation of the topmost body of the WTO, particularly in the current world economic and trade environment, which requires international cooperation, direct political involvement at the multilateral level, and strong credible institutions (WTO, 2009). 9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in the agriculture sector, land rights and access to water and other natural resources are of equal importance in this context. However, the following discussion will be limited to the interface of the multilateral trading system and food security. 10 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life(FAO, 1996). 11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country Like Minded Group (23 June 2000), GAGNGW13 Kenya (12 March 2001), GAGNGW136 and Small Island Developing States (29 December 2000), GAGNGW97, wto. orgenglishtratopeagricenegsbkgrnd02props1e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2011). 12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador (23 June 2000), GAGNGW13, wto. orgenglishtratopeagricenegsbkgrnd02props1e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2011). 14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause not more than minimal distortion of trade or production, set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 15 Substantial improvements in market access reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support (WTO, 2001, para. 13). 16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduction commitments. 17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)65) 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)91) 12 Oct 2005 (JOB(05)230) 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)304) 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)303) 11 May 2006 (JOB(06)143) 7 June 2006 (JOB(06)173) 16 June 2006 (JOB(06)189Rev.1) 28 Mar 2007 (JOB(07)35) 3 June 2008 (JOB(08)47) 28 Jan 2010 (TNAGGEN30). 18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)135) 3 May 2006 (JOB(06)137) 20 February 2008 (JOB(08)6) 8 April 2008 (JOB(08)24). 19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)187). 20 16 May 2006 (JOB(06)145). 21 Arguably, civil society organisations also played an important role in highlighting some of these connections. See, for example, Oxfam (2002). 22 See, for example, proposals dated 27 Sept 2002: Cairns Group (JOB(02)132) and Canada (JOB(02)131). 25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to maintain an adequate level and to take into account the interests of food aid recipient countries. To this end, a safe box for bona fide food aid will be provided to ensure that there is no unintended impediment to dealing with emergency situations. Beyond that, we will ensure elimination of commercial displacement. To this end, we will agree effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization and re-exports so that there can be no loop-hole for continuing export subsidization. 26 6 March 2006 (TNAGGEN13). 27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)122). 28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)78). 29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (GAGNGW93) Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)164) Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)182) Cuba, 20 Jan 2003 (JOB(02)190Corr.1 Korea, 18 Dec 2002 (JOB(02)220) Japan, 28 Feb 2003 (JOB(03)41 G-20), 18 May 2006 (JOB(06)147) Japan and Switzerland, 30 Apr 2008 (JOB(08)34) Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, 6 Apr 2011 (JOBAG18). List of illustrations References Electronic reference Christophe Bellmann. Jonathan Hepburn and Marie Wilke . The Challenges Facing the Multilateral Trading System in Addressing Global Public Policy Objectives , International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement Online, 3 2012, Online since 27 February 2013, connection on 08 March 2017. URL. poldev. revues. org1012 DOI. 10.4000poldev.1012 About the authors Programmes Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). He has previously worked for the Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations. He also was a Research Associate at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago. By this author Published in International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement . 6.2 2015 Published in International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement . 5.2 2014 Published in International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement . 2 2011 Published in International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement . 1 2010 Agriculture Programme Manager, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Before joining ICTSD, he represented Oxfam International at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, and led Oxfams global campaign on aid, debt and the Millennium Development Goals. He previously worked on trade, development and human rights issues at the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva. By this author Published in International Development Policy Revue internationale de politique de dveloppement . 2 2011 International Trade Law Programme Officer at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Previously she worked for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and for the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. She holds a law degree from Hanse Law School and an LLM in Public International Law from Helsinki University (summa cum laude). Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License. What factors explain why the worlds trading nations have become increasingly interdependent, from an economic and political viewpoint, during the post-World War II era Interdependence among todays economies reflects the historical evolution of the worlds economic and political order. Since World War II, Europe and Japan have re-industrialized. What is more, the formation of the European Community and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, as well as the rise of multinational corporations, has contributed to closer economic and political linkages. What are some of the major arguments for and against an open trading system Proponents of an open trading system maintain that free trade leads to lower prices, the development of more efficient production methods, and a greater range of consumption choices. Free trade permits resources to move from their lowest productivity to their highest productivity. Critics of an open trading system maintain that import competition may displace domestic firms and workers. It is also argued that during periods of national emergency, it is in the best interests of a nation to protect strategic industries. What significance does growing economic interdependence have for a country like the United States For the United States, growing economic interdependence has resulted in exports and imports increasing as a share of national output. Profits of domestic firms and wages of domestic workers are increasingly being affected by foreign competition. What problems does terrorism pose for globalization The threat of international terrorism tends to slow the degree of globalization and also make it become costlier. With terrorism, companies must pay more to insure and provide security for overseas staff and property. Heightened border inspections could slow shipments of cargo, forcing companies to stock more inventory. Tighter immigration policies could reduce the liberal inflows of skilled and blue-collar laborers that permitted companies to expand while keeping wages in check. Moreover, a greater preoccupation with political risk has companies greatly narrowing their horizons when making new investments. Which of the following are examples of a change in the world due to the liberalization of investment Check all that apply. - Interest rates stabilized and remained at lower levels as capital moved more freely - Chinas infrastructure grew rapidly once the government allowed foreign investment - The establishment of the euro led to lower transaction costs, spurring additional investment between European countries Time is an Arabic translator. For a long time, he has trouble finding more than a few hours of work per week. But in recent years, as many Middle Eastern countries have opened their borders to more trade, Time has fielded many requests from businesses looking for a translator to help him meet new clients. Because there arent very many Arabic translators in Tims town, he has even been able to raise his rates and still keep a busy schedule. International trade has Tim. The WBG is supportive of an open, rules-based, predictable multilateral trading system, and among its objectives are to help countries participate in and enjoy the benefits of such a system. Key strategies for reaching these goals are supporting trade agreements, emphasizing trade and competitiveness at the core of national development strategies, and promoting trade-related reforms through effective Aid for Trade programs. The WBG helps governments design and implement policies to maximize their trade competitiveness in both goods and services. The approach encompasses the full set of policies that shape individual firms capacities and incentives to import and export. The work aims to help governments reap the gains from openness to trade and regional integration, and also to manage risks of economic changes, such as adjustment costs and external shocks. The main pillars of the World Bank Groups work in trade are: Trade Policy and Integration . Analysis and policy advice to help countries eliminate unneeded non-tariff measures, or NTMs Modernizing services regulations and trade Addressing the poverty and labor impacts of trade policies and shocks Supporting global and regional integration, including free trade agreement negotiations and World Trade Organization accession and participation. Trade Performance . Help for governments in designing and implement policies to maximize their trade competitiveness in both goods and services. Assistance to create a comprehensive policy frameworks that shape individual firms capacities and incentives to import and export Help for governments to reap the gains from openness to trade and to manage both adjustment costs and external shocks. Competition Policies . Eliminating anti-competitive market regulations Strengthening antitrust rules Promoting pro-competition sector policies State-owned enterprises. Trade Facilitation and Logistics . Strengthening trade corridors, supply chains, and trade logistics Modernizing border management Enhancing connectivity between firms, markets, and consumers. To fund much of this work, the World Bank Group has five main, trade-related trust funds totaling 122 million: The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development 2 (MDTF-TD2) is the largest source of donor funds supporting analytical trade work across the WBG. The WBG has received 34.5 million in pledges to the MDTF-TD2 over three years. The Trade Facilitation Support Program (TFSP) is multi-donor platform launched in June 2014 that provides developing countries with rapid-response technical assistance to help them align with the World Trade Organizations December 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement. To date, 30 countries have sought support from the 30 million trust fund. The Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) supports improvements in customs and other trade facilitation systems that help developing countries reduce trade costs and improve competitiveness. As of March 2015, 76 projects with an allocation of 49.8 million have been approved. Eighty percent benefit African countries. The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) trust fund supports WBG work as part of the global EIF partnerships efforts to help least developed countries tackle constraints to trade. It funds capacity-building in LDCs, diagnostics that identify key trade constraints, and implementation of technical assistance projects. The trust fund has received 4.3 million and is currently providing trade-related support to 15 LDCs. The Transparency in Trade (TNT) trust fund is an ongoing partnership between the ITC (Geneva), UNCTAD, and the WBG, with active support from the AfDB. Its goal is to collect and make available data on non-tariff measures and services trade policies. Currently, Russia, contributing US1.5 million, is the only donor to the TNT. Lending and Technical Assistance : The Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project, currently under preparation, is a 140 million, multi-country investment operation that tackles constraints to cross-border trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its five neighbors, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Investments in cross-border infrastructure, policies relating to border operations, and cross-border administration will help lower trade costs, improve trading capability, reduce time to cross borders, and help integrate conflict-affected communities. In Lao PDR, WBG technical assistance has helped develop the Lao Trade Portal, an online tool that serves as an authoritative source on the countrys trade laws, regulations, and procedures. The trade portal reduces the time needed for traders to acquire information and carry out transactions. In Honduras, WBG technical assistance improved trade-related procedures for agribusiness products by linking three critical government agencies to simplify exports and imports. More than 700 Honduran companies selling abroad can now obtain export permits in one day, compared to the three days it took previously. In Kenya, the World Bank Group is advising the government on competition regulations that will break up cartels in key economic sectors. These regulations will prohibit anticompetitive agreements, generating private savings for firms and households. Estimates put savings at about 18 million annually in insurance markets alone. In the Philippines, the World Bank Group has helped implement reform that dramatically cuts the time needed to register new vessels. One result is that incumbent operators are no longer able to prevent new companies from serving certain routes. This translates into a potential 5 percent savings in transport logistics costs. Policy Advice and Analysis: The WBGs Trade Competitiveness Diagnostic Toolkit facilitates a systematic assessment of a countrys performance and capabilities in export markets. It has been applied in over 25 countries. Within the WBG Doing Business Project. which measures business regulations and their enforcement across 189 economies, the Trading Across Borders indicator measures the time and cost (excluding tariffs) of exporting and importing cargo by sea. A recent report, Africas Unexplored Potential in Trade in Services . sheds light on uncharted opportunities for services trade in Africa and invigorates the discussion about the role of services in trade diversification and economic upgrading on the continent. A recent book, Making Global Value Chains Work for Development . highlights ways developing countries participating in GVCs can grow, advance, and create jobs, when governments have the proper policies in place. Open Trade Data: In cooperation with other international development partners, the WBG launched the Transparency in Trade Initiative to provide free and easy access to data on country-specific trade policies. This initiative includes the recently revamped World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and the Services Trade Restrictions Database . The biennial Logistics Performance Index (LPI) measures the logistics quotfriendlinessquot of 160 countries based on a worldwide survey of freight forwarders and express carriers. The Trade Costs Dataset shows that developing countries face disproportionately higher costs and lower levels of trade integration than high-income countries. To better monitor trade policy developments, the WBG has supported the Global Trade Alert. a joint venture of think tanks around the world, and maintains the Temporary Trade Barriers Database. Both databases allow users to track the use of trade-distorting government measures initiated since the 2008 crisis.